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REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE
BUSINESS AND PUBLIC LAW
No. 15, 79th CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION
HERBERT H. NAUjoKcs
Mr. Chief Justice Stone's prophecy in his dissenting opinion in the
famous case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Asso-
ciation' that because of that decision "only time and costly experience
can give the answers" to the many novel and important questions that
will confront the insurance industry, has certainly come true. The
Court's decision in that case overturned a precedent of seventy-five
years' standing in reversing the ruling made in Paul v. Virginia,2 that
insurance is not commerce. Now everyone knows that insurance is
commerce and that when the business of insurance is conducted across
state lines, it constitutes interstate commerce. The confusion resulting
from the Court's holding in the South-Eastern Underwriters decision,
was not dispelled by Congress when it enacted Public Law No. 15,
79th Congress, 1st Session.3
1 322 U.S. 533, 88 L. ed. 1440, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944).
2 75 U.S. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (1868).
3 Public Law No. 15, 79th Congress, 1st session, reads as follows:
"AN ACT
To Express the Intent of the Congress with Reference to the Regulation
of the Business of Insurance.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America .in Congress assembled, that the Congress hereby declares
that the continued regulation and taxation by the several states of the business
of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Con-
gress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation
of such business by the several states.
SEC. 2 (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several states which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or super-
sede any law* enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance; Provided, That after
January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman
Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of
September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by state law.
SEC. 3 (a) Until January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
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The purpose of Public Law No. 15, is to express the intention of
Congress with reference to the regulation of the business of insurance.
Congress by this act declared that:
"* * * the continued regulation and taxation by the several
states of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be con-
strued to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several states."
Public Law No. 15 declared that:
"No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee
or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, That after January 1,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sher-
man Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known
as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914 known
as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law."
It further provided that:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect
in any manner the application to the business of insurance of the
Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known as the National Labor
Relations Act, or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known
as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of June 5,
1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920."
Under the provisions of Public Law No. 15, 79th Congress,
1st Session, it appears that today (and until January 1, 1948) the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act shall
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the Act of June 19, 1936,
known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to
the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act in-
applicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
SEC. 4. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to affect in any
manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5,
1935, as amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act
of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
or the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
SEC. 5. As used in this Act, the term 'State" includes the several states,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
SEC. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision
to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act,
and the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than
those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected.
Approved March 9, 1945."
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not apply to the business of insurance or the conduct thereof, except
that the Sherman Act shall apply to agreements to boycott, coerce or
intimidate, or to acts of boycott, coercion or intimidation. However,
the National Labor Relations Act of 1938, the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 apply to insurance
to the same extent as heretofore.
After January 1, 1948, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and
the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be applicable to the business
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law. The Robinson-Patman Act shall apply to the business of in-
surance, apparently without reference to whether insurance is regu-
lated by State law. Also the National Labor Relations Act of 1938,
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and the Merchant Marine Act
of 1920 apply to the business of insurance to the same extent as
heretofore.
Numerous questions have already arisen with reference to the
effect on the insurance industry of Public Law No. 15 and the federal
statutes mentioned in that Act. Among the questions frequently asked
are the following: First - How do the federal statutes referred to
in Public Act. No. 15 affect the insurance industry? Second - Whal
did Congress mean in providing that certain federal acts therein men-
tioned "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by state law", after January 1,
1948? Third - Does membership in a regional or national organiza-
tion gathering information on rates, policy forms, coverages, and the
like, violate the Sherman Act?
In order to understand rightly Public Law No. 15 and its impact
upon the business of insurance, it is important that the origin, history
and purpose of the federal acts mentioned in Public Law No. 15 be
understood. With this in mind, this article will examine briefly the
federal statutes in the order of their importance, beginning with the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUsT ACT
Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act, there was no federal
legislation in respect to the regulation or control of monopolies, con-
tracts and combinations in restraint of trade. There is no common
law of the United States as such; that is, federal jurisprudence does
not recognize the common law with respect to crimes. Hence, there
was no authority in the Federal Government to punish persons who
committed acts which at common law constituted unlawful restraint
of trade. The individual states were unable to suppress effectively
this menace which had arisen in America in the last half of the nine-
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teenth century, because these monopolistic aggregations crossed state
lines. It soon became apparent that the only way to repress success-
fully these monopolistic aggregations would be by the enactment of
federal legislation which would make impossible the evasion and cir-
cumvention previously practiced. Finally, on July 2, 1890, Congress
passed a bill, thereafter known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, de-
signed to curb such evil and to keep open "the free and natural flow
of trade in the channels of interstate commerce."
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provided, in part:
"SECTION 1. Every contract, combination, in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce, among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal . .."
SECTION 2. Every person, who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
While the language of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is broad and
sweeping, it is not in any sense precise. Mr. Justice Stone in Apex
Hosiery Company v. Leader4 pointed out that:
"* * * The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated
in terms of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself
did not define them. In consequence of the vagueness of its
language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left
to give content to the statute, * * *"
In the early years of the existence of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law
the United States Court interpreted the Sherman Act in such a
manner as to deprive it of much of its effectiveness as a remedial
statute. The decision in United States v. E. C. Knight,5 where the
rule of law announced was that a restraint of trade, however un-
reasonable, is not prohibited by the Anti-Trust law, no matter how
disastrous the interference may be upon commerce among the several
states unless it directly affects commerce, apparently limited the power
of the federal government to deal with monopolies and trusts. The
Knight case has been overruled by subsequent decisions. As a result,
the formation of trusts and gigantic combinations was stimulated. The
decisions in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,
and United States v. Joint Traffic Association7 established that the
Sherman Act applied to all contracts in restraint of trade including
such contracts between railroad companies. Since these decisions did
4310 U.S. 469, 84 L.ed. 1311, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940).
5 156 U.S. 1, 39 L.Ed. 325 (1895).
6 166 U.S. 290, 41 L.Ed. 1007 (1897).
T 171 U.S. 505, 43 L.Ed. 259 (1898).
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not involve combinations of industrial enterprises, they had no appre-
ciable effect on the organization of trusts at this period. Then came
the decision in Addyston Steel & Pipe Co. v. United States,8 which
was the first decision of the Supreme Court since the Knight case that
related directly to industrial combinations- This decision greatly
strengthened the Sherman Act and restrained, to some extent at least,
the further creation of trusts. The next important decision was the
one rendered in the Northern Securities9 case, which held illegal a
holding company as a combination in restraint of trade. The decision
in the Northern Securities case gave indications of the powerful force
which the Anti-Trust Act was to exert in later dealing with combina-
tions and trusts.
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court set at rest some of the
doubts expressed as to the potency of the Anti-Trust Statute of 1890
to control monopolistic combinations by ordering a dissolution of the
Standard Oil and American Tobacco Companies in United States v.
Standard Oil Co.,"0 and United States v. American Tobacco Co."
The adoption in these cases of the famous "rule of reason" as the
standard to be applied in deciding cases arising under the Sherman
Act, however, caused widespread disapproval. Later the unsatis-
factory results obtained in accomplishing the actual dissolution of
these two trusts were blamed on the supposed weakness of the Sher-
man Act.
Because of the mounting popular criticism of the Sherman Act,
Congress in 1914 adopted the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts to clarify and strengthen the Sherman Law. These laws will be
discussed hereinafter, but previous mention should be made of several
other decisions construing the Sherman Act which are important to
the insurance industry.
In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States,12 the
Supreme Court, in speaking of the provisions of the Anti-Trust Laws,
said:
"Nor can they be evaded by good motives. The law is its
own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits, or forbids,
and the judgment of the Courts cannot be set up against it
in a supposed accommodation of its policy with the good inten-
tion of the parties, and it may be, of some good results."
In United States v. Socony Oil Company, 3 the court declared
that:
"* * * For over forty years this court has consistently and
without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing
8 175 U.S. 211, 44 L.Ed. 136 (1899).
9 193 U.S. 197, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904).
10 221 U.S. 1, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911).
"1221 U.S. 106, 55 L.Ed. 663 (1911).
12 226 U.S. 20, at p. 49, 57 L.Ed. 107 (1912).
13 310 U.S. 150 at p. 218, 84 L.Ed. 1129, 60 S. Ct 811 (1940).
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agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and
that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which
those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may
be interposed as a defense. * * *"
In Parker v. Brown,114 the court held that state legislation setting
up a scheme for regulating the marketing of raisins by producers with
a view to maintaining and stabilizing market price, under which the
imposition of restrictions was to be proposed by and had to be ap-
proved by a referendum of producers, was not prohibited by the pro-
visions of the Federal Anti-Trust Act making it unlawful to combine
or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states, since the Federal
Act is aimed solely at combinations to restrain competition and at-
tempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations and does not
apply to state action.
In the Maple Flooring,5 and Cement Manufacturers6 cases, it
was held that trade associations which openly and fairly gather and
disseminate information as to the cost of their product, the volume
of production and other trade statistics, without any attempt to reach
any agreement as to prices or any intention to restrain competition, do
not violate the Sherman Act.
Consideration of other decisions construing the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law would extend this article unduly. Adherence by the insur-
ance industry to the principles and rules laid down in the considered
cases will tend to protect the business of insurance not only from
litigation involving the Anti-Trust laws but also from criticism con-
cerning their method of doing business.
THE CLAYTON ACT
On October 15, 1914 the Congress enacted the Clayton Act, the
first statutory addition to the Sherman Law. The Clayton Act is
entitled "An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful re-
straints and monopolies, and for other purposes", and embodies the
result of nearly twenty-five years of experience undei: the original
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. As has been noted, the original
Anti-Trust law had been criticized as being vague and general and
the construction given to it by the courts was unpopular.
The Democratic party of 1912 included in its platform a statement
favoring an amendment to the Sherman Act. "We regret", this state-
ment declared, "that the Sherman Anti-Trust Law has received a
'4317 U.S. 341, 87 L.Ed. 315, 63 S. Ct. 307 (1§43).
'5 Maple Flooring Mfg. Asso. v. U.S., 268 U.S. 563, 69 L.Ed. 1093, 45 S. Ct. 514(1925).
16 Cement Mfg. Protective Assoc. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 69 L.Ed. 1104,
45 S. Ct. 586 (1925).
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judicial construction depriving it of much of its efficiency, and we
favor the enactment of legislation which will restore to the statute
the strength of which it has been deprived by such interpretation".
This pronouncement of one of the major political parties - followed
by the election of the Democratic candidate to the presidency -
proved to be the basis for legislation in 1914 designed to supplement
the Sherman Act.
On the other hand, moderate-sized business units were dissatisfied
with the judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act, because it not
only denounced great aggregations of capital in the form of trusts, but
the Act likewise denounced cooperative agreements among moderate-
sized business competitors where the intent was not to monopolize.
These moderate-sized enterprises favored relaxation of the Sherman
Act. They protested that they were unable to determine what they
could or could not do under the law. It is not at all surprising, there-
fore, that legislation designed to reconcile these varying demands with
respect to the Anti-Trust laws should prove to be confusing and, to
some extent, ineffectual.
The primary and fundamental purpose of the Clayton Act was to
suppress monopoly in its incipiency, by setting up a series of statutory
definitions declaring in specific terms that the acts so defined should
be deemed in unlawful restraint of trade, and by means of such defini-
tions to clarify the meaning of the Sherman Act.
In United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States,"' the Court,
in construing Section 3 of the Clayton Act, pointed out that:
"The Clayton Act was intended to supplement the Sherman
Act, and within its limited sphere established its own rule.
Under the Sherman Act, as interpreted by this Court before
the passage of the Clayton Act, contracts were prohibited which
unduly restrained the natural flow of interstate commerce, or
which materially interrupted the free exercise of competition
in the channels of interstate trade. In the second section
monopolization or attempts to monopolize the interstate trade
were condemned. 'The Clayton Act (section 3) prohibits con-
tracts of sale, or leases made upon the condition, agreement,
or understanding that the purchaser or lessee shall not deal
in or use the goods of a competitor of the seller or lessor
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract, or such con-
dition, or agreement of understanding 'may' be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. The cause of
action is therefore not the same. * * * The Clayton Act speci-
fically applies to goods, wares, machinery, etc. whether 'pat-
ented or unpatented'. This provision was inserted in the Clayton
Act with the express purpose of preventing rights granted by
patent from securing immunity from the inhibitions of the act."
17258 U.S. 451, at p. 460, 66 L.Ed. 708, 42 S. Ct. 363 (1922).
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The Clayton Act deals with a wide range of subjects - some of
which have no place in an anti-trust measure. It applies only to
interstate commerce and deals chiefly with (1) unjust trade dis-
crimination; (2) sales or leases conditioned upon exclusive handling
by vendee or lessee of vendor's or lessor's goods, wares and merchan-
dise; (3) the exemption of labor and labor organizations from federal
regulation and control; (4) corporate acquisition of capital stock of
other corporations; (5) interlocking corporate directorates; (6) regu-
lation of bids between corporations for supplies and materials; (7)
the issuance of injunctions and restraining orders in the enforcement
of the above matters.
Under section 7 of the Clayton Act an insurance company may
not acquire the stock of a competing company, where the effect of
the transaction may be to substantially lessen competition, or to re-
strict commerce or tend to create a monopoly. Section 14 of the Act
imposes individual liability upon the directors, officers, and agents
of a corporation which has violated the provisions of the Anti-Trust
laws, where such individuals "have authorized, ordered, or done any
of the acts constituting in whole or in part such violations." The
remedy of the "triple damage" suit is created by Section 4 of the Act.
It provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property" through a violation of the Anti-Trust laws may recover
triple damages against the guilty party, together with costs of suit
and reasonable attorney fee.
A study of the decisions of the courts applying the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 demonstrates the
futility of attempting by statutory enactment of legislative definitions
to strengthen or supplement existing laws. As one text writer well
said :'s
."It will be apparent from this review of the legislation of 1914
that, insofar as the proponents of the supplemental anti-trust
legislation had hoped to clarify the law of restraints and mon-
opolies by substituting specific rules of conduct for general
principles, they largely failed."
The stock acquisition and interlocking directorate provisions of the
Clayton Act are of great importance to many insurance companies
because of the need for fleet operation or other forms of underwriting
combinations of sufficient resources to cover single risks of tremen-
dous size. Many insurance companies, however, are not affected by
these provisions of the Clayton Act.
is Henderson, G. C., The Federal Trade Commission, p. 48 (1924), Yale Univer-
sity Press.
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TIE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN AcT
The Federal Trade Commission Act dates from September 26,
1914 and was adopted, as was the Clayton Act, to supplement and
strengthen the Sherman Act. The Federal Trade Commission Act
established an administrative tribunal to which businessmen could
resort for advice and guidance. As President Woodrow Wilson pointed
out in an address to Congress on January 20, 1914:
"* * * The business men of the country desire something
more than that the menace of legal process in these matters
be made plain and intelligible. They desire the advice, the defi-
nite guidance and information which can be supplied by an
administrative body, an interstate trade commission."
And in the same address President Wilson pointed out further that:
"* * * Nothing hampers business like uncertainty. Nothing
daunts or discourages it like the necessity to take chances, to
run the risk of falling under the condemnation of the law
before it can make sure just what the law is. * * *"
The Federal Trade Commission Act gives the Commission broad
and sweeping powers over businesses engaged in interstate commerce.
It provides:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons ... from using unfair methods of competition in com-
merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
"Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe
that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or
is using any unfair methods of competition or unfair or decep-
tive act or practice in commerce, and if it shall appear to the
Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would
be to the interest of the public .. .
it may issue and serve a complaint, hold a hearing, and issue a
"cease and desist" order against the offender.
The Act also contains provisions giving the Commission broad
powers to investigate the "organization, business, conduct, practices
and management of any corporation engaged in commerce," and to
require such corporation to file with the Commission, under oath,
"'reports or answers in writing to specific questions, furnishing to the
Commission such information as it may require as to the organization,
business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other cor-
porations . . ."
The scope of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the method
of its administration by the Commission, were concisely outlined by
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the Supreme Court in Federa Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing
Company,'9 as follows:
"* * * The case now before us was begun under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which was intended to supplement
previous anti-trust legislation. That act declares unlawful 'un-
fair methods of competition', and gives the Commission author-
ity, after hearing, to make orders to compel the discontinuance
of such methods. What shall constitute unfair methods of
competition denounced by the act is left without specific defini-
tion. Congress deemed it better to leave the subject without
precise definition, and to have each case determined upon its
own facts, owing to the multifarious means by which it sought
to effectuate such schemes. The Commission, in the first in-
stance, subject to the judicial review provided, has the deter-
mination of practices which come within the scope of the
act * * *"
In the case of L. B. Silver v. Federal Trade Commission," Circuit
Judge Denison, in discussing Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act,
said:
"A study of the Congressional Record convinces me that
the Federal Trade Commission Act was wholly collateral to
the Sherman and other Anti-Trust Acts, and that the unfair
methods of competition, intended to be reached by Section 5,
are only such methods as tend towards that monopoly or re-
straint of competition which the Anti-Trust Acts prohibit."
If the Supreme Court adheres to its new concept that insurance
is commerce, insurance companies will in the future be subject to
visitations from the Federal Trade Commission in appropriate pro-
ceedings under this act. It is to be noted that no concerted action
by a group of companies is necessary to bring the Federal Trade
Commission into action; the act relates'to "unfair methods of competi-
tion" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce", and not
necessarily to combination or conspiracies participated in by more than
one company. Consequently, the Commission may proceed in a proper
case against a single insurance company.
What would constitute "unfair methods of competition" or "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices", as applied to the insurance business?
As the Supreme Court said in Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut
Packing Company,21 these terms have been "left without specific
definition" in the act itself. The Commission has never heretofore
had occasion to apply them to the insurance business, but it has com-
piled a rather extensive list of business, practices generally which it
19257 U.S. 441, at p. 453, 66 L.Ed. 507 (1922).
20289 Fed. 985, at p. 993 (1923).
21257 U.S. 441; 66 L.Ed. 307, 42 S.Ct. 150 (1922).
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condemns as being in violation of the act. Most of these condemned
practices pertain more particularly to dealings in tangible goods and
commodities.
Just what attitude the Commission may take in exercising police
power over the great insurance industry remains to be seen. It would
be futile to indulge in predictions. However, in the absence of any
federal act for the comprehensive control and regulation of the in-
surance industry, and in view of the improbability that Congress will
enact such a statute at an early date, the Federal government may
find the Federal Trade Commission Act a convenient means by which
to investigate any suggested -evils prevalent in the insurance industry,
and to obtain data and evidence for prosecutions under the anti-trust
acts. There is a sound basis for the belief that at the end of the
moratorium period provided in Public Law No. 15 [Sec. 3 (a)] the
insurance business will be held to be subject as well to the regulatory
and investigatory powers of the Federal Trade Commission Act as
to the anti-trust features thereof. The Federal Trade Commission
has the machinery for investigations and could undertake hearings and
make findings with much less fanfare and unfair publicity than could
a Committee such as the National Economic Committee approved
by Congress in 1938.
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN PRICE DISCRIMINATION AcT
The Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act prohibits
price discrimination in the sale of "commodities" and "goods" of
like grade and quality, with power vested in the Federal Trade Com-
mission to police its provisions. Under the South-Eastern Underwriters
decision,2 2 it is clear that in 1936, when this amendment was enacted,
Congress had the power to include insurance within its scope, although
the insurance industry was probably not aware of this fact. The
question is: Did Congress intend, by the language which it employed
in that Act, to include insurance within its terms? Do the terms
"commodities" and "goods", as used in the Robinson-Patman amend-
ment, extend to a sale of insurance, and the issuance of an insurance
policy, or are they meant to embrace only tangible articles of com-
merce? In Paul v. Virginia,"3 the Supreme Court, in referring to
insurance policies, said:
"They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in
the market as something having an existence and value inde-
pendent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to
be shipped or forwarded from one state to another, and then
put up for sale."
22 322 U.S. 533, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (1944).
2375 U.S. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1868).
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The theory that an insurance policy is not a "commodity" as that
term is used in state statutes has been generally followed by the state
courts in applying state laws although some courts have reached a
contrary conclusion.24
Legal opinion is divided on the question whether the Robinson-
Patman Act applies to insurance. Many attorneys are of the opinion
that insurance is not a "commodity" within the meaning of the
Robinson-Patman Act, nor within the term "goods, wares, and mer-
chandise" as used in Section 2 (c) of the Act. However, the Supreme
Court may give such words a broad interpretation. In an early United
States Supreme Court decision, Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts,5 the Court held that "commodities" as used in a
constitutional provision authorizing the taxation of commodities will
be construed to mean "convenience, privilege, profit and gains" and
will not be confined to goods and wares only. In Equitable Trust Co. v.
Keene,28 credit available by a cable transfer of exchange to England
was held to be either a "commodity" or a "chose in action" under
a New York Statute. Stocks and bonds are deemed "commodities"
under various state statutes; People v. Federal Security Co.;-7 Opinion
of Justices;28 Pound v. Lawrence.29 And, as has been pointed out
before, insurance has been defined as a "commodity" in some cases
and in other cases the courts have held to the contrary. 0
It is clear that Paul v. Virginia3 has been overruled, in so far
as it laid down the principle that "insurance is not commerce"; but
has the concept that insurance policies "are not commodities" also
been repudiated? Such concept, if not rejected, has at least been
greatly wakened, and earlier cases which relied upon what was said
in Paul v. Virginia, are no longer of much force.
When the Robinson-Patman amendment is read in its entirety,
however, it seems clear that Congress was aiming at price discrimina-
tions in the field of ordinary commodities of commerce, such as butter
and eggs, bread, milk, and other types of goods and merchandise,
and nothing more. This view is fortified by the decision of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Fleetway v.
Public Service Company.32 It was there contended that a drastic
cutting of fares during a rate war between two bus companies consti-
tuted a violation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act. The United States
24 7 Words and Phrases. Perm. Ed. 841; 41 Corpus Juris 129.
2a 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 632, at p 640, 18 L. Ed. 904 (1868).
21 183 N. Y. S. 699. at p. 700 (1920).
ar 255 Ill. 561, 99 N.E. 668 (1912).
28 196 Mass. 603, 85 N.E. 545 (1908).
2 233 S.W. 359 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921).
80 7 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed. (841); 41 Corpus Juris. 129.
a' 75 U.S. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1868).
32 72 Fed (2d) 761 (C.C.A. 3d.-1934).
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Circuit Court, in discussing the word "commodities" as used in the
act, said at page 763:
"This clearly refers to a commodity such as merchandise,
and has no reference to transportation of passengers by bus."
The Robinson-Patman amendment was probably not intended by
Congress to apply to the insurance business. Nevertheless, an authori-
tative court decision may be required to settle any doubts on this
subject. The Supreme Court having said that Congress in 1890 in-
tended to include insurance within the scope of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, the same court might rule that insurance is a "commodity"
within the meaning of the Robinson-Patnan amendment to the Clay-
ton Act.
OTHER AcTs MENTIONED IN PUBLIC LAW No. 15
Attention is now directed to the three Federal Acts, which under
Public Law 15 apply to the business of insurance to the same extent
as heretofore. These Acts are not nearly as important to the insurance
industry as the Federal Acts just discussed.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT
Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
"The Board is empowered.., to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce."
Prior to June 5, 1944, the Labor Board, in administering the Act,
had held in at least thirteen different cases, beginning as early as 1940,
that insurance companies -came within the purview of the Act. These
earlier decisions of the Board will be found collected in a footnote
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Polish National Alliance "v.
National Labor Relations Board.3 Any question regarding the appli-
cation of the National Labor Relations Act to the insurance industry
was definitely settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Polish National Alliance case, which was argued, submitted, and de-
cided contempoianeously with the South-Eastern Underwriters case.'
It is possible that insurance companies will not have to run the
gauntlet of picket lines, strikes, slow-downs and other like incidents
which characterize the labor disputes in 'the American industrial field.
But if the insurance industry does escape all this, it will be due to the
fact that a mutually harmonious relationship had developed between
employer and employees, and not because the insurance industry is
excluded from the operation of the At.
33 322 U.S. 643, 88 L.Ed. 1509 at p. 1514, 64 S.Ct. 1196 (1944).
4 322 U.S. 533, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (1944).
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FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Sections 6 and 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which relate
to minimum wages and maximum hours, cover any non-exempt em-
ployee "who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce."
It has been the uniform position of the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor that most employees of insurance com-
panies have so close a connection with activities in interstate commerce,
including the constant use of the mails and other instrumentalities of
commerce, as to be a part of such commerce and hence subject to the
Act. Even before June 5, 1944, most insurance companies had, as a
matter of policy, voluntarily observed and complied with the require-
ments of the Fair Labor Standards Act, without necessarily conceding
that its provisions were legally applicable to them. All doubts on
the subject were settled by the decisions in the South-Eastern Under-
writers,35 and Polish National Alliance16 cases. Compliance by in-
surance companies with the Act is now a necessity, where such com-
pliance was formerly on a more or less voluntary basis.
THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT
The Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, covers a variety of
subjects.
Section 885, Title 46, U.S.C.A., under heading "shipping" provides:
"(2) (b). Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws as desig-
nated in section 12 of Chapter 1 of Title 15, shall be construed
as declaring illegal an association entered into by marine insur-
ance companies for the following purposes: To transact a
marine insurance and reinsurance business in the United States
and in foreign countries and to reinsure or otherwise appor-
tion among its membership the risks undertaken by such asso-
ciation or any of the component members."
Other sections of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 are not of
sufficient importance to the insurance industry to warrant further
discussion in this paper.
PUBLIC LAw No. 15
Finally attention is again directed to Public Law No. 15, in order
to consider primarily the question almost universally asked in con-
nection with the Act as applied to insurance rating regulations and
proposed insurance rating laws, which question is the meaning of
the word "regulation", as used in the law.
35 322 U.S. 533, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (1944).
36322 U.S. 643, 88 L.Ed. 1514, 64 S.Ct. 1196 (1944).
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The authorities teach us that the word "regulate is generally
construed broadly as meaning to adjust or control by rule, method
or established modeY'
In the majority of decided cases the word "regulate" has been
given a comprehensive and broad meaning with appropriate regard
to the welfare of those immediately concerned in the matter, as well as
the public at large .3
Does the Law require each rate to be affirmatively approved by
the state to constitute "regulation" by the state within the meaning
of Public Law No. 15? Legal opinion is divided on this question.
Many eminent authorities, including former Attorney General Biddle,
believe that the term "regulation" as used in the Act calls for affirma-
tive action by the state, thus requiring specific approval by the state
for each and every insurance rate. The author does not agree with
this conclusion. In his opinion the Law is fully satisfied if the state
sets up a statutory standard for insurance rates. A statute which pro-
vides that all rates shall be reasonable, adequate and not unfairly
discriminatory would, in his opinion, constitute "regulation" by the
state as that word is used in Public Law No. 15. Further provisions
could include filing of rules, rates, rating plans, manuals and any
amendments thereto.
However, life insurance companies are not directly affected by
this problem inasmuch as such companies are generally not members of
rating organizations, and their rates are based on actuarial tables
required by law and not subject to agreement between any two or
more such companies.
MEMBERSHIP IN REGIONAL OR NATIONAL BUREAUS OR ORGANIZATIONS
The question is often asked, whether insurance companies belong-
ing to national or regional organizations would be in violation of the
Sherman Act. The author does not believe that a combination of
companies or company officials in national or regional organizations
would per se constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. The Maple
Flooring9 and Cement Manufacturers, 4  cases hold that the mere
gathering and, dissemination of data and information, without any
agreement as to prices is not a violation of the Sherman Act. Regard-
less of the fact that such organizations might gather information on
37 State v. Guertin, 89 N.Y. 126, 193 AtI. 237, 239 (1937) ; Higgins v. Mitchell Co.
Commissioners, 6 Kans. Apn. 314, 51 Pac. 72, 73 (1897); In re Fleming, 191
N.Y.S. 586, 588, 117 Misc. 373 (1921); State ex rel Wagner v. Field, 218 Mo.
App. 155, 263 S.W. 853. 857 (1924) ; Words and Phrases, Vol. 36, pp. 714 et seq.
38 See Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, 88 Mont. 180,
293 Pac. 294, at T). 301 (1930).
39 268 U.S. 563, 69 L.Ed. 1093, 45 S.Ct. 514 (1925).
40 268 U.S. 588, 69 L.Ed. 1104. 45 S.Ct. 586 (1925).
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rates, coverages, policy forms and the like, and pool the experience
of the several member companies, this would not violate the Act if
the rates suggested by such organizations are required to be filed with
a state bureau or with the insurance commissioner and where approval
of such filings are required by law. When the state approves such
rates, coverages, policy forms, rating plans or other agreements, this
should constitute "regulation" by the state, and the company members
of the bureau proposing such rates, agreements and the like, should
be immune from the Sherman Act under Public Law No. 15." That
the state insurance commissioner or state bureau followed the sug-
gestion or recommendation of a regional or national bureau would not
militate against such state approval constituting "regulation" within
the terms of the Act. The court will construe Public Law 15 broadly
in the public interest.
Amidst all of the confusion and uncertainty created by the South-
Eastern Underwriters'2 decision, one fact is clear and that is that
the numerous questions which have arisen and other questions which
will in the future arise can only be settled by an authoritative decision
of the Supreme Court. Such decisions, as Mr. Chief Justice Stone
points out in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, "can only be made
upon a case-to-case basis" after a consideration of all of the relevant
facts and circumstances and "only time and costly experience can give
the answers".43
CONCLUSIONS AND REcOMMENDATIONS
(A) In General
Any conclusions reached herein must be formulated in the light
of the public interest in this problem. The business of insurance is
such an important one and has such a tremendous impact upon our
every day social and business life, as well as upon the whole economic
structure of our nation, that the only safe guide for future action
is the public interest. The divergent, manifold and oft-time conflicting
interests of the insurance companies, their agents or brokers, and the
insurance departments of the several states, must be reconciled with
the public interest fully protected.
The race by the insurance industry and the State Insurance Com-
missioners to beat the deadline of January 1, 1948 by agreeing upon
a program of state regulation pursuant to Public Law 15 has at times
taken on the appearance of a contest between the insurance industry
to preserve its present way of doing business and the state insurance
departments to preserve at all cost complete state regulation of insur-
41 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 87 L.Ed. 315. 63 S.Ct. 307 (1943).
42322 U.S. 533, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (1944).
48322 U.S. 533, at p. 582. 88 L.Ed. 1440, 1473-1474 (1944).
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ance, without particular regard to the public interest. Any attempt by
the insurance industry to obtain complete exemption from all of the
Federal Acts mentioned in Public Law 15 without regard to the
public interest would be short-sighted and productive of only more
regulation by Congress. On the other hand, if whole or partial exemp-
tion from Federal regulation should be sought in the honest belief
that, the industry, the policyholders and the public will be benefitted,
this spirit of public service would redound to the benefit of all.
Under Public Law 15, a way is provided for insurance companies to
continue many of their practices, particularly those relating to cooper-
ative action concerning rating plans and rate making. If collaboration
between companies on this phase of the business is to be legal it must
be "regulated" by state law. Public Law 15 is a recognition by Con-
gress of the fact that on many matters unified action by two or more
companies may be in the public interest.
Nevertheless, it is certain that the days of self- regulation of the
insurance industry, as they have been known, through voluntary united
action are ended, except as such regulation is taken before January 1,
1948, or such action thereafter as is based upon some state statute
so as to constitute "regulation" by the state under Public Law 15.
In this connection, it is of interest to note that the legislative pro-
posal agreed upon by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners to be submitted to Congress, but which was subsequently
changed, listed seven requisite insurance activities involving agree-
ments or concerted or coQperative action:
1. Rate making, including forms and underwriting rules;
2. Use of uniform rates, forms and rules;
3. Loss adjustment and inspection service;
4. Underwriting and reinsurance pools;
5. Payment of commissioners;
6. Pooling of statistics;
7. Rate making, including rules or plans, under agreement that
the use is not mandatory.
Other activities which could involve concerted action and which
might be added to the Commissioners' list include: the use of policy
provisions and endorsements, appointment of agents, audits and col-
lection of premiums, accident or fire prevention, and the collection
of salvage.
Whether or not the doctrine of Parker v. Brown" may ultimately
be invoked with judicial approval for the protection of insurance com-
panies complying with the requirements of state statutes, it is common
knowledge that cooperative action of the companies in the past has
44 317 U.S. 341, 87 L.Ed. 315, 63 S.Ct. 307 (1943).
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not been limited to specific things called for by state insurance laws.
Moreover, in many states there are no regulatory statutes upon this
subject similar to those involved in Parker v. Brown. Hence there
appears no escape from the conclusion that the insurance industry
as a whole must get ready to review and revise its former business
practices in the realm of self regulation in conformity with the rulings
of the United States Supreme Court and Public Act No. 15. Clearly,
all cooperative activities between insurance companies are not con-
demned nor, on the other hand, are all such activities permissible.
In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,45 the Supreme Court
took original jurisdiction on complaint of the State of Georgia against
a number of railroad companies, alleging violation of the Sherman
Act with regard to concerted rates, notwithstanding that such rates
were approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The ultimate
decision in this case may affect the character of insurance rate legisla-
tion and other permissible cooperative action. If the doctrine laid
down in Parker v. Brown,46 is overruled or modified, state activity
in the field of concerted action by companies will constitute no com-
plete defense to an action under the Sherman Act unless such activity
is held to constitute "regulation" by the state within the purview of
Public Law 15.
(B) Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
From the foregoing it is manifest that the chief problems con-
fronting the insurance industry, in view of the South-Eastern Under-
writers decision and Public Act 15, 79th Congress, First Session, are:
1. The meaning of the word "regulated" as used in Public
Act 15, and as applied particularly to insurance rating regu-
lations and proposed insurance rating laws.
This arises more specifically in connection with the operations of
companies belonging to regional or national rating organizations where
such organizations gather information on rates, coverages; policy forms
and the like, and where they pool the experience of the several member
companies and thereafter conform to the experience gained through
membership in these organizations. State rating organizations provided
for by state law would be legal under Public .Law 15. Membership
in a regional or national rating- organization would not violate the
Sherman Law where the state authorities must approve the rate; this
would constitute "regulation" within the meaning of Public Law 15.
No problem in this connection arises insofar as most life insurance
companies and fraternal societies are concerned, inasmuch as such
45 324 U.S. 439, 89 L.Ed. (ad.op.) 758, 65 S.Ct. 1018 (1945).
46 317 U.S. 341, 87 L.Ed. 315, 63 S.Ct. 307 (1943).
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companies and fraternal societies are not members of any national
or regional rating organizations. Their rates are based on actuarial
tables required by law, and hence no action is necessary in the author's
opinion generally to bring most life insurance companies and fraternal
benefit societies within the purview of Public Law No. 15 and the
Sherman Law on this point. Many fire insurance companies and
casualty companies, on the other hand, must, prior to January 1, 1948,
change their practices and methods of doing business to conform to
the Sherman Act.
2. The Insurance Industry and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law
- Membership in Regional Organizations.
Under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
Maple Flooring7 and the Cement Manufacturers8 cases, many of
the joint activities of insurance companies coming under the Sherman
Act would appear to be perfectly lawful. However, the foregoing
cases were decided by a divided Court, and since those decisions were
handed down some twenty years ago, it is quite possible that the
Supreme Court today might not agree with the rule there laid down.
The present Court might well consider that joint activities of insurance
companies without specific state sanction, relating to interchange of
reports, statistics, forms, endorsements, engineering and loss data and
the like would constitute a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.
As a matter of safety, therefore, it would appear to be desirable for
the insurance industry to obtain enactment of state legislation ex-
pressly authorizing such concerted action by insurance companies. This
would remove any doubt as to the legality of cooperative or joint action
by two or more companies. Any state laws adopted could carefully
circumscribe the permitted concerted action in the public interest.
While specific exemption for insurance corporations from the
provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act could be obtained by
amending that law, it is doubtful whether Congress would enact such
amendments.
3. The problem of intercompany stock ownership and inter-
locking directorates under the Clayton Act.
Life insurance companies and fraternal benefit societies, in the
author's opinion, generally are not affected by these provisions of the
Clayton Act. Each fraternal benefit society operates strictly on its
own and there are no instances of where one fraternal benefit society
controls another, either through stock ownership or interlocking direc-
torates. Fraternal benefit societies are organized without capital stock
47268 U.S. 563, 69 L.Ed. 1093, 45 St.Ct. 514 (1925).
48 268 U.S. 588, 69 L.Ed. 1104, 45 S.Ct 586 (1925).
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and are carried on solely for the mutual benefit of their members
and beneficiaries. Life insurance companies generally are not con-
cerned, although this statute may be of great importance to certain
life companies. Other branches of the insurance industry, including
automobile, casualty and surety, are more vitally concerned because
of the need for fleet operation or other forms of underwriting com-
biriation of sufficient resources to cover single risks of tremendous size.
In order that all branches of the insurance industry be in the clear
under the Clayton Act, state statutes could be adopted which would
provide for something less than outright prohibition, by permitting,
under proper safeguards, such stock ownership and interlocking direc-
torates as might be in the public or policyholders' interest and where
in fact no attempt is made to restrain trade or establish a monopoly.
4. The Federal Trade Commission Act.
The Federal Trade Commission Act relating particularly to "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce" does not necessarily require a combination or con-
spiracy participated in by more than one company to bring into play
its provisions. The fraternal benefit societies contend that they are
not engaged in competition in commerce in the sense that these terms
are used in the Federal Trade Commission Act. They could be wrong
in this view. Because of the very broad powers given to the Com-
mission by the Federal Trade Commission Act to examine and investi-
gate; it is clear the insurance industry may, at the expiration of the
moratorium period, be affected by this law. It would appear to be
rather difficult to obtain exemption by state legislation due to the
sweeping provisions of the Federal Act. Thus there remains only one
other solution to this problem and that is by federal exemption in
the Act itself or by amendment to the Sherman Anti-trust law. Such
exemption might be difficult to obtain. The situation thus requires
the insurance industry to adjust itself to the fact that after January
1, 1948, very likely the Federal Trade Commission must be reckoned
with as a factor in the operation of their business.
5. The Robinson-Patman Act.
Under the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act, pro-
hibiting price discrimination in the sale of "commodities" and "goods"
of like grade and quality, there is a question whether this was in-
tended to apply to insurance. Moreover, the practices it prohibits
(discrimination and rebates) are generally prohibited by state law.
However, it must be kept in mind there is always a chance that the
Supreme Court might construe this statute broadly as applying to
insurance. Only an authoritative court decision can determine the
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question of the application of this statute to insurance. The laws
of the several states governing the sale of insurance and the issuance
of insurance policies impose practically the same requirements with
regard to the sale of insurance as the federal act does to the sale
of tangible articles. Specific exemption of the insurance industry by
amendment to the Robinson-Patman Act would clarify the status
of insurance companies under the act.
6. The National Labor Relations Act.
With respect to the National Labor Relations Act, it is clear since
the decisions in Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations
Board,9 and United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associa-
tion,"4 that this act applies to the insurance industry. Most insurance
companies, even prior to the decision in the Polish National Alliance
case, had established mutually harmonious relations with their em-
ployees and it is unlikely that any friction between the companies and
their employees will in the future develop. No action is required by
the insurance companies to bring them within the scope of this law
since it is clear that they are subject to this law.
7. The Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Fair Labor Standards Act relating to minimum wages and
maximum hours has been observed generally by the insurance industry
voluntarily for some time. However, now compliance by insurance
companies with that act is a necessity, whereas such compliance prior
to the South-Eastern Underturiters and Polish National Alliance cases,
supra, was on a voluntary basis.
8. The Merchant Marine Act.
The Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920 has no application to
insurance generally and is of interest only to marine companies in
certain circumstances relating to combinations for writing marine in-
surance or reinsurance.
4322 U.S. 643, 88 L.Ed. 1509, 64 S.Ct. 1196 (1944).
50 322 U.S. 533, 88 L.Ed. 1440, 64 St. Ct. 1162 (1944).
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